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West a historic opportunity to build an Atlantic 
Partnership founded on close cooperation between 
two equal partners. 
While congratulating Dr. Hallstein on successful 
first steps toward establishment of a common agri-
cultural policy and recognizing a common ap-
proach to agriculture as essential in the construc-
tion of an integrated Europe, the President 
emphasized the importance of agricultural exports 
to the trade of the United States and other Free 
World countries, and repeated his expectation that 
the Community would take these factors into ac-
count. In this respect, the President referred to 
the special responsibility of the highly industrial-
ized powers, such as the United States and the 
European Economic Community, to work for free 
and non-discriminatory access to their markets for 
the products of developing nations in Latin Amer-
ica, Africa and Asia. 
Dr. Hallstein affirmed his sincere support for 
the President's trade program 1 and for its objec-
tives of reducing barriers to trade, on a non-dis-
criminatory basis, between the two great trading 
units of the United States and the European Eco-
nomic Community. The President and Dr. 
Hallstein agreed that a program of this nature 
promises to add great strength and cohesion to 
the West. Dr. Hallstein expr1>.ssed the view that 
the President's trade program offers the basis for 
fruitful negotiation, in a spirit of genuine reciproc-
ity, between the United States and the European 
Economic Community. 
1 For text of the President's message to Congress, see 
BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the 
proposed legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343. 
The European Economic Community and United States Trade Policy 
by Joseph D. Coppock 
Director, Foreign Economic Advisory Staff 1 
I welcome the opportunity to discuss with you 
this important subject of the European Economic 
Community and U.S1• trade policy. 
In thinking back over the history of interna-
tional economic events, it is hard to recall any-
thing which excited as much interest and attention 
as has the European Common Market. The estab-
lishment of the German Zoll/,_,erein in 1834, Great 
Britain's repeal of the corn laws in 1846, the 
British-French treaty of 1860 estrublishing almost 
free trade, the acceptance of the gold standard by 
the principal trading countries in the 1870's, the 
suspension of gold payments by the British in 
1931, the establishment of the British Imperial 
Preference System in 1932, the initiation of the 
1 Address made before the Texas Group of the Invest-
ment Bankers Association of America at San Antonio, 
Tex., on Apr. 9 (press release 227 dated Apr. 6; as-
.=-delivered text). 
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Hull trade agreements program in 1934, the cre-
ation of the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment in 1945, the signing of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947-all of 
these notable events in the field of international 
trade and finance seem, at least at present, less 
important than the European Economic Com-
munity. Only an event of great importance would 
warrant the amount of ink that has been spilled 
and the amount of woodpulp that has been used 
in describing and analyzing it. It has titillated 
the political mind, the business mind, the :financial 
mind, the academic mind, the military mind. 
Let me refresh your minds on the basic facts. 
A treaty was signed at Rome on March 25, 1957, 
by representatives of France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. It 
was ratified by their Governments in the course 
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Fourth, a persistent, patient effort should be 
made to find some basis of cooperation between 
neighboring · dle Eastern nations, however 
tentative or restr ive the areas of cooperation 
may be. 
There is no magic dra tic formula for stability 
in the Middle East or any 1ere else. In spite of 
our vast military and indus · al power, our ca-
pacity to shape events there, as lsewhere, is no 
more than marginal., Yet a patien iplomacy, a 
firm willingn~ to stand against threats aggres-
sion, a sensitive understanding of what mo · vates 
others, and the wise use of our resources in a · -
ing economic development may provide the margin 
between chaos on the one hand and growing po-
litical and economic stability on the other. 
One thing at least is certain: Only throu 
creation of just societies, whose citiz s have 
genuine independence, individual di · y, and ma-
terial welfare, can world peace · h dignity be 
established. In this regard t future course of 
events in the Middle East re ains uncertain. But 
U.S. Supp s U.N. on Freedom 
of Exit r Mr. Tshombe 
owing is the text of a Department state-
nt released on April 18 indicating U.S. support 
or the stand taken by Acting U.N. Secretary-
eneral U Thant in instructing Robert Gardiner, 
o cer in charge of the U.N. Operatiof in the 
Oo o, to take such steps as were necesf..ary to as-
8'1llre e safe departure from Leopold'l/ille on that 
day o Mou;e Tshombe, President:of Katanga 
Provine. ' 
Press release 9 dated April 18 / 
I 
Misunders ndings arose bet\veen Mr. Tshombe 
and the Gove ent of the Congo in connection 
with a recess in e talks b ween Prime Minister 
[Cyrille] Adoula d M . Tshombe in Leopold-
ville. Mr. Adoula le eopoldville yesterday for 
a short trip upriver ter arranging with Mr. 
Tshombe that the etin would be resumed on 
Saturday. Mr. ombe t n decided to return 
to Elisabethvill . Mr. Tshom e's departure from 
Leopoldville s delayed by o rs of the Congo 
Government. Under the assuranc given by the 
U.N., Mr. shombe must have full f dom to de-
part from Leopoldville whenever he 
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the U.N. is taking steps to carry out its commit-
ment. At the time Mr. Tshombe was give the 
U.N. assurances, the United States Gov ent 
expressed its confidence in them. e United 
States Government continues full o support the 
United Nations assurances a supports the in-
struction communicated to y by the Secretary-
General to Mr. Gardine . 
mic Planning Team 
ritish Guiana 
A U.S. economic planning team will arrive in 
Br 'sh Guiana on April 18 for a visit of approxi-
mate 4 to 6 weeks. The team will assist in 
bringing e most modern economic experience to 
bear upon t eappraisal of British Guiana's de-
velopment pro 
be Harry G. Hoff n, a specialist in economic 
and social developmen roblems and editor of the 
Charleston (West Vir ·a) Gazette. Alvin 
Mayne, chief economist of tn Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, is d,eputy team leader. In addition to 
U.S. planning experts, technicians from the 
United Kingdom and international development 
organizations will be associated with the team. 
Dispatch of the team is responsive to the desires of 
all segments of British Guiana opinion. 
~ 
President and Dr. Hallstein Review 
U.S.-EEC Relations 
Followvng u; the tewt of a joint cowmunique 
released at Washington on April 1~ at the close 
of a meeting between President Kennedy and 
Walter Hallstein, President of the Oommiss-ion of 
the European Economic Community. 
White House pres,s relea'Se dated April 12 
The President and Dr. Walter Hallstein, Presi-
dent of the Commission of the European Economic 
Community, have met at the White House today. 
The President and Dr. Hallstein reviewed with 
satisfaction important developments of the past 
year, including the successful completion of the 
first stage of the Common Market. They agreed 
that the continuing evolution of a strong, closely 
knit European entity presents to statesmen of the 
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of 1957 and went into effect on January 1, 1958. 
· The treaty is of book length. It has 248 articles 
in the main body and several lengthy annexes. 
The purposes are expressed vividly in the pre-
• amble of the treaty, as follows: 
Determined to establish the foundations of an ever 
closer union among the European peoples, 
• Decided to ensure the economic and social progress of 
their countries by common action in eliminating the bar-
riers which divide Europe, 
• Directing their efforts to the essential purpose of con-
stantly improving the living and working conditions of 
their peoples, . 
Recognizing that the removal of existing obstacles calls 
for concerted action in order to guarantee a steady ex-
pansion, a balanced trade and fair competition, 
Ana:ious to strengthen the unity of their economies and 
to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the 
differences existing between the various regions and by 
mitigating the backwardness of the less favoured, 
Desirous of contributing by means of a common com-
mercial policy to the progressive abolition of restrictions 
on international trade, 
Intending to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe 
and overseas countries, and desiring, to ensure the devel-
opment of their prosperity, in accordance with the prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Resolved, to strengthen the safeguards of peace and 
liberty by establishing this combination of resources, and 
calling upon the other peoples of Europe who sbare their 
ideal to join in their efforts, 
Have decid,ed to create a European Economic 
Community .... 
What the EEC proposes to do to pursue these 
objectives has been concisely stated as follows: 2 
(1) To remove tariffs, quotas, and other barriers to 
trade within the Community by gradual stages; 
(2) To create a uniform external tariff between the 
Community and the rest of the world, and to act as a 
unit in negotiating on external commercial policy with 
others; 
(3) To abolish restrictions on the movement of services, 
labor, capital, and business enterprises within the Com-
munity; 
( 4) To allow colonies and associated territories of the 
Six (mainly in Africa) to link themselves to the Common 
Market, extending the benefits of the Common Market to 
their exports, while allowing them to maintain restraints 
on imports; 
(5) To prohibit private cartels and other restraints 
on trade unless they foster the improving of production 
or distribution or technical and economic progress ; 
(6) To coordinate monetary and fiscal policies in order 
• Robert R. Bowie and Theodore Geiger, "The European 
Economic Community and the United States," Subcom-
mittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic 
Committee, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (Joint Committee print). 
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to promote balance of payments, high employment, and 
ptice stability in each member country; 
(7) To establish a common agricultural policy within 
the Community; 
(8) To create an Investment Bank for Europe and a 
Development Fund for Associated Overseas Territories 
to transfer capital to the less developed parts of the Com-
munity and to dependent or associated areas; 
(9) To equalize wages for men and women and har-
monize methods of computing overtime ; to undertake to 
improve and harmonize living and working conditions 
within the Community ; 
(10) To create a Social Fund to finance retraining, 
resettling, or otherwise assisting workers harmed by liber-
alizing trade within the Common Market. 
Organizational Arrangements of EEC 
The organizational arrangements are suffi-
ciently complex to warrant description. In order 
to do this I must remind you of two other organi-
zations embracing the same membership: the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community, begun in 1952 
under the popular name of the Schuman Plan, 
and the European Atomic Energy Community, 
begun in 1958 under the popular name of 
EURATOM. There is a Council of Ministers of 
the member countries, which serves all three com-
munities. There is a Court of Justice, which also 
serves as legal adjudicator of the three treaties. 
There is a European Parliamentary Assembly, 
composed of members elected from and by the na-
tional legislatures of the member countries. Then, 
on the executive level, are the High Authority of 
the Coal and Steel Community, the Commission 
of the Atomic Energy Community, and the Com-
mission of the European Economic Community. 
The European Economic Community is ex-
pected to be in full effect by 1970. 
The aspect of the EEC to which we Americans 
have paid most attention has been the customs 
union feature, which will eliminate all internal 
trade barriers and provide a common external 
trade policy, including a common tariff. As 
should be evident from the statement of purposes 
and the planned actions, the EEC involves much 
more than a customs union. It is a treaty, a plan, 
a constitution for the gradual but complete inte-
gration of the economies of the member countries. 
Of necessity, such integration calls for much po-
litical cooperation, perhaps even confederation or 
federation. 
These are the bare bones of the European Eco-
nomic Community. I should now like to deal 
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with three major questions concerning it. First, 
what brought it about~ Second, how is it doing i 
Third, how does it affect the United States i 
Origins of EEC 
First, its origins. It is tempting to review the 
efforts through modern European history to unify 
Europe, but I shall deal with events and circum-
stances only since 1945-and with only some of 
them. The end of World War II left Europe in 
a weakened condition, unable to defend itself 
against the aggressive push of the Russians with-
out the military and economic assistance of the 
United States. The longrun alternative to pov-
erty, internal bickering, and military weakness-if 
not Communist takeover-was some kind of coop-
eration. Western Europe responded to the initia-
tive of the United States in establishing the Or-
ganization for European Economic Cooperation 
and in participating in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. It was essential that some way be 
found to bring Western Germany into close and 
permanent association with other countries of 
Western Europe, particularly France. Men of 
great vision subordinated the long history of 
Franco-German rivalry to a vision of a cooperative 
or voluntarily unified Europe. Social invention 
of the first order was required, and many dedi-
cated persons rose to the opportunities. The 
Schuman Plan for a Coal and Steel Community 
was the first really strong measure for welding 
these old enemies together as friends. 
Despite these European efforts, it is doubtful 
if the steps toward European economic union could 
have progressed without the two strong external 
pressures-from the U.S.S.R. to the east and from 
the U.S.A. to the west. The U.S.S.R. maintained 
its threatening posture; the U.S.A. maintained its 
encouraging posture. Viewed historically, the 
Russian attitude is more readily understandable 
than our own. The Russians have had strong 
historical reasons to fear a strong, unified Western 
Europe. Napoleon, Wilhelm II, and Hitler are 
bitter reminders to them. Until quite recently 
Americans have felt insulated from the European 
power struggles. Only after World War II, after 
much debate and soul searching, did the United 
States conclude that the Soviet and Communist 
threat was of such a magnitude that a unified 
Western Europe was not only in the interest of 
the Europeans but also in our basic interest too. 
Together, Western Europe and North America· 
would have a preponderance of military and eco- · 
nomic power which could deal with the Soviet 
Communist menace. We have become convinced 
that the people of Western Europe share our ideals' 
of freedom and democracy so deeply that there is 
no risk of a unified Europe throwing in its lot 
with the Russians against us. Therefore we want 
a strong ally, not a lot of weak or uncertain ones. 
Signs of EEC Success 
Now the second question : How is the European 
Economic Community doing~ You know what 
the answer is. It is doing fine. But let me give 
you some numbers to support this statement. Be-
tween 1953 and 1960 the real gross national prod-
uct of the EEC countries rose at a rate of 5.5 
percent per year; the United States GNP grew 
at a rate of 2.5 percent. EEC exports increased 
from $14.1 billion in 1953 to $30 billion in 1960, 
or 113 percent, compared with a 29-percent in-
crease in U.S. exports. EEC imports went up 
by 99 percent and U.S. imports by 35 percent. 
These export and import figures refer to current 
values, without adjustment for price changes. In-
flation has been brought under control. The EEC 
countries have built up large enough monetary 
reserves to allow full convertibility of their cur-
rencies on current account and moderately liberal 
capital movements. Unemployment is not a 
major problem, except in parts of Italy. EEC 
capital investment has been running at 20 percent 
or more of GNP; compared with our 15 percent. 
Another sign of success, at least as impressive 
as the statistical measures, is the application for 
membership in the EEC by the United Kingdom. 
The announcement was made in August 1961, and 
the negotiations have been proceeding since last 
fall. This is a momentous action by the United 
Kingdom. Only a half century ago Great Britain 
was the leading industrial country in the world; 
she ruled a vast empire, her navy ruled the waves. 
Now the empire is mostly gone, though cordial 
bonds link the Commonwealth. British military 
power, relative to that of other major powers, is 
now only a fraction of what it was. As of 1960 
the gross national product of the United Kingdom 
was $69 billion, compared with $177 billion for the 
EEC, $225 billion for the Soviet Union, and $504 
billion for the United States. These are estimates, 
.of course. 
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During the discussions of European economic 
. union in the early 1950's, the British took the po-
sition that their Commonwealth obligations and 
their relation with the United States were such 
- that they should not associate themselves as firmly 
with continental Europe as the developing plans 
envisaged. When the EEC was consummated, 
Britain took the lead in organizing a European 
Free Trade Association, composed of the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, 
Switzerland, and Portugal, which called for the 
gradual elimination of tariffs among the members 
but with each maintaining its own tariff with re-
spect to outsiders. By 1961 it became apparent 
that this organization did not have the vitality 
that the EEC had. For one thing, Britain had 
had a slower rate of economic growth than the 
EEC, and it had boon in balance-of-payments 
difficulties quite frequently. 
It is to the great credit of the British leaders 
and the British people that they have seen the 
opportunities available to them in the Common 
Market. Other countries are also seeking admis-
sion. The United States Government has played 
a sympathetic but detached role in this compli-
cated and sensitive process of negotiation. 
How the Common Market Affects the U.S. 
This brings me to my third question: How 
does the Common Market affect the United States~ 
I have already indicated that, from a political and 
military point of view, the position of the United 
States is clear. We welcome strong allies. Eco-
nomically, the effects of the EEC on us are compli-
cated. The financial and economic press have vied 
with the governmental economists in turning out 
analyses of these effects, usually with masses of 
statistics. Let me state right off that I think that 
there are too many variables involved to make 
quantitative predictions reliable. Moreover, some 
of the variables, such as our own trade policy, are 
unknown. 
Some things can be said, however. One is that 
the increasing European prosperity will tend to 
increase the demand for U.S. exports. Imports 
from the outside amounted to about 11 percent of 
GNP for the EEC countries in 1960. U.S. exports 
to them amounted to $2.25 billion, or one-eighth of 
the total of imports into the EEC. Hence, if the 
marginal propensity to import approximates the 
average propensity, a 5-percent increase in EEC 
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GNP-about $9 billion with reference to the 1960 
figure of $177 billion-would increase total EEC 
impori:8 by 11 percent of $9 billion, or $1 billion. 
The U.S. share of that $1 billion would be one-
eighth, or $125 million. I can think of one good 
reason why the figure might be larger, namely, 
that the Europeans will want more and more of 
our consumer gadgetry as they get better off. But 
I can think of another good reason why the figure 
might be smaller, namely, that the Europeans--
and associated American firms-will produce 
many of the mass-market consumer goods in 
Europe instead of import them. I do not know 
how you measure these forces, but the way several 
hundred American companies have rushed to 
establish subsidiaries or affiliates in Europe in the 
last 4 years makes me think that the production in 
Europe will have the edge. Of course U.S. firms 
operating there will increase their earnings over 
the years. 
Another effect that can be analyzed pretty well 
is the so-called discrimination effect. As the tariffs 
among the members of the EEC move toward zero 
and the external tariff becomes standardized, 
American companies selling in Italy, for example, 
will be at a disadvantage as compared with, say, 
German companies, because American imports into 
Italy will have to pay the tariff while German 
imports will not. How important this effect will 
be will depend on the height of the Common 
Market external tariff. Although the projected 
Common Market tariff is now known, it is subject 
to reduction through negotiation. Whatever its 
height, however, it will discriminate to that degree 
against American exports-and all other non-EEC 
exports-and in favor of internal EEC trade. 
This is the nature of a customs union. Lest this 
make us feel gloomy, just remember that many 
other things besides tariffs affect trade. 
As I said earlier, people who start analyzing the 
effects of the EEC like to inject statistics into the 
picture. I wish to indulge briefly in that game 
and to present to you some figures which are seeing 
the light of day for the first time, as far as I know. 
This is a frequency distribution of the tariff rates 
for the United States and for the EEC. The rates 
are all expressed in ad valorem percentage terms, 
and they are the rates in existence prior to the 
round of negotiations completed in Geneva last 
month.8 A distribution of this sort is much more 
8 For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561. 
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reliable as a measure of tariffs than weighted av-
erages, which understate the restrictive effects of 
high rates. 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. AND EEC TARIFF 
RATES 
Rates (or ad valorem 
equivalent rates) 
of duty 
Free _____________ _ 
0.1-9.9%-- --- -- ---
10.0-19.9_ --- ____ --
20.0-29.9 __ -- _____ _ 
30.0 and above ____ _ 
U.S. 
Number Percent 
of rates of rates 
990 20 
894 18 
1,510 29 
775 15 
895 18 
EEC 
Number Percent 
of rates of rates 
270 10 
538 19 
1,624 56 
358 13 
45 2 
TotaL __ _ _ __ 5, 064 100 2, 835 100 
The interesting thing here is not the average of 
median rates but rather the spread. Thirty-three 
percent of our rates are 20 percent or above; 15 
percent of the EEC rates are that high. Many of 
our rates are above 50 percent. At the other end, 
20 percent of our items are duty free, while only 
10 percent of theirs are. Now it is a fine parlor 
game to speculate on the expansionary effects of 
tariff reductions, but it is not a scientifically de-
pendable exercise. All we can say with confidence 
is that lower trade barriers increase the oppor-
tunities for trade and inject new competition and 
vitality into the economic life of the countries in-
volved. Dynamic factors cannot be measured 
easily, but they may be the most important. 
Now here is where the President's Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962 4 comes into the picture. The 
Europeans are prepared to negotiate tariff reduc-
tions if we are. Therefore the bill now before 
Congress asks authority for the President to ne-
gotiate reductions of up to 50 percent of the pres-
ent levels in return for equivalent concessions by 
other countries. It also asks for authority to go 
all the way to zero on items of which we and the 
EEC export 80 percent of the total free-world ex-
ports. Statistical analysis shows that this has 
meaning only if the United Kingdom is included 
in the EEC. There is also a provision for lower-
ing tariffs down to zero on primary commodities 
of particular interest to the less developed coun-
tries, provided the Europeans will go along and 
provided they are not produced in sufficient 
quantities in the United States. I should point 
out that U.S. agriculture has a tremendous in-
terest in maintaining access to the European mar-
ket but that the European farmers are under-
' For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress, 
see ibid., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 281 ; for a summary of the 
proposed legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343. 
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standably reluctant to give up their longstanding / 
protective arrangements, many of them similar, 
to our agricultural programs. 
The President's bill also has several provisions 
for overcoming seriously adverse effects on Ameri-_ 
can firms and workers resulting from tariff re-
ductions. Adjustment assistance is the most im-
portant new element here. 
To conclude: The European Economic Com-
munity is a fact of life. Its success is of the first 
order of importance for us in world political 
terms. Its economic effects on us are difficult to 
ascertain, but the probably bad effects will be 
minimized and the probably good effects will be 
maximized if we equip ourselves-through a clean 
Trade Expansion Act-to negotiate substantial, 
gradual reductions in the tariffs which tend to 
divide the great new Common Market of Europe 
and the even greater, older common market of the 
United States, the common market that the 
Founding Fathers of this Republic had the wis-
dom to establish in 1787. 
Trade Policy for the 1960's 
by Philip H. Trezise 
Acting Assistant Secretary /0'1' Economic Affairs 1 
For 4 weeks now the Ways and Means Commit-
tee of the House of Representatives has been 
holding public hearings on H.R. 9900, the Trade 
Expansion Aot of 1962. 2 The committee has heard 
262 witnesses testifying for and against the bill. 
These hearings are a part of the national debate 
on our policy toward international trade. They 
will be followed by debate on the floor of the House 
and by hearings and debate in the Senate. And 
they have had their echoes in the Nation's press 
and in innumerable public and private discussions 
around the country. 
It would be impossible to summarize in a few 
moments all the matters covered at the Ways and 
Means Committee hearings, to say nothing of all 
1 Address made before the Action for Foreign Policy 
group at Pittsburgh, Pa., on Apr. 12 (press release 286). 
• For text of President Kennedy's message to 'Congress, 
see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 281 ; for a summary of 
H.R. 9900, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343; for a statement 
made by Under Secretary Ball before the Ways and 
Means Committee on Mar. 13, see ibid., Apr. 9, 1962, p. 597. 
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', the questions asked and answered in the discussions 
• taking place around the country. For this eve-
. ning I would like to focus on one point. This is 
the extent of the authority that would be given the 
. President to deal with American tariffs under the 
draft bill. 
During the course of the Ways and Means Com-
.mittee hearings, and even more often in the press, 
there have been statements that H.R. 9900 would 
give the President "unprecedented" and "sweep-
.ing" powers over our tariff schedules. These are 
sweeping phrases themselves, and perhaps they 
reflect our national tendency to use exaggerated 
language in discussing public issues. 
The term "unprecedented" surely is used in a 
loose sense. The legislation before the Congress 
would confer on the President the authority to 
negotiate about tariffs with other countries. This 
power has been held by every President since the 
first Trade Agreements Act was passed in 1934. 
Every President since 1934, moreover, has used the 
power. Each one did so under rules laid down by 
Congress when it delegated authority to the Presi-
dent. All of this has been reviewed by the courts, 
and its constitutionality has been affirmed. 
The grant of authority under the new law thus 
would be an extension of a time-honored delega-
tion of negotiating power to the President by the 
Congress. It is not a departure from the past. It 
is true, however, that the specific kinds of negotiat-
ing authority to be given the President contain a 
new element. It will be helpful to go over the 
relevant provisions of the law. 
Summary of BIii 
First, the President would be empowered to 
negotiate, on the basis of mutual benefit, reduc-
tions of 50 percent in American tariffs in return 
for reductions in other people's tariffs. This pro-
vision might be called the standard trade agree-
ments authority. It would be applica;ble to any 
of our free-world trading partners, and it would 
cover, abstractly at least, almost all of the articles 
covered by our existing tariff schedules. Similar 
50-percent authority has been granted to Presi-
dents on two occasions in the past. 
A second provision would empower the Presi-
dent to negotiate with the Common Market for 
the mutual reduction or elimination of duties on 
a limited number of commodity categories. This 
is new in tariff negotiating authority. It would 
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be operative only with respect to the countries 
adhering to the Treaty of Rome at the time of 
negotiations. It would cover only those categories 
of goods in which the United States and the Com-
mon Market countries accounted for 80 percent of 
free-world trade during some base period sub-
sequent to December 31, 1956. These are limiting 
definitions. On the other hand, negotiations with 
the Common Market under this authority would 
not be subject to a percentage limitation on the 
extent of duty reductions but would rather leave 
this open. 
Third, the new legislation would permit the 
President to offer in negotiations the reduction or 
the elimination of American tariffs that are now 
at 5 percent or less by value. These duties, in the 
main, are nuisance levies although they are ad-
ministratively burdensome on exporters and im-
porters. 
Finally, the new act would give the President 
the authority to reduce or to eliminate duties on 
products of tropical agriculture and forestry, sub-
ject to the condition that the Common Market 
take similar and nondiscriminatory action. This 
is a very special provision. It stems from our 
desire to open markets in the advanced countries 
on ·a nondiscriminatory basis to all of the pro-
ducers of tropical products, in Latin America, in 
Asia, and in Africa. 
These negotiating authorities, as you see, are 
defined and limited by the proposed statute. 
Moreover the President would be required, as he 
is now, to seek the advice and guidance of the 
United States Tariff Commission. There would 
be, upon the enactment of this or any bill, admin-
istrative provision for extensive study within the 
executive branch and for hearings open to the 
interested private parties before tariff negotiations 
could be undertaken. In the negotiations that 
would ensue, our negotiators would be trading 
tariff reductions for tariff reductions as they have 
in the past. They would be acting not only under 
formal instructions to get benefits for the United 
States but also under strong personal and official 
pressures to get for the United States the most 
useful reductions possible in other people's tariff 
barriers. 
A judgment about the merits of this proposed 
grant of negotiating authority to the President 
must rest in the end on the answers to two ques-
tions. First, is it in the United States interest to 
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take the lead in attempting to bring down barriers 
to international trade generally i Second, is the 
special authority to deal with the Common Market 
a desirable grant of power i 
The answer to the first question may be debated, 
but there are certainly impressive reasons for be-
lieving that our interests abroad and the interests 
of our domestic economy as well would be well 
served by an expansion of free-world commerce. 
On the basis of experience we could expect our 
exports to grow substantially more rapidly than 
our imports with a consequent benefit to our diffi-
cult balance-of-payments problem. The growth 
of international trade, we could confidently ex-
pect, would act to raise living standards every-
where and to increase understanding among 
peoples and nations. The United States is so 
dominant a figure in the world economy that it 
alone can provide the leadership to undertake a 
new drive to bring down the artificial obstacles 
that now inhibit the expansion of trade. The au-
thorities to negotiate on tariffs which are provided 
in the Trade Expansion Act amount to an ex-
pression of American readiness to continue our 
role of leadership in the free world. 
Authority To Negotiate With Common Market 
The proposed authority to negotiate with the 
European Common Market is sufficiently new and 
different as to present a separate question. For 
the first time in the history of our trade agree-
ments legislation we have singled out a group of 
countries for special negotiations. To understand 
why, we need to look at the Common Market as it 
is and as it may be. 
The Treaty of Rome, which was signed on 
March 25, 1957, provided among other things for 
a customs union among six of the industrial states 
of Western Europe: Germany, France, Italy, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Al-
though customs unions are not new on the world 
stage, the Common Market, even confined to these 
six nations, is an unusual undertaking. It includes 
170 million people. Its total volume of inter-
national trade is about 70 percent larger than our 
own. Its total output of goods and services has 
been growing recently at a rate of about 7 percent 
per year, or more than twice as fast as ours. It 
is already a great industrial power rivaling in 
many respects the United States and comparable 
to or ahead of the Soviet Union. 
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The success of. the Common Market has been : 
reflected in dramatic increases in business activity, • 
in increased foreign trade, and in rising wages . 
and purchasing power. This has had its impact . 
throughout Europe. Greece has indicated its de- . 
sire to join and has already been given associated 
membership. The United Kingdom, Denmark, 
and Ireland are negotiating for admission, and, 
Norway has indicated its intention of doing so. 
Elsewhere in Western Europe, in Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Austria, and Spain, there is lively interest 
in the Common Market and a deep concern to 
work out some kind of arrangements for associa-
tion with it. 
If negotiations with Britain, Denmark, and 
Ireland are successfully concluded, the Common 
Market will grow immediately to about 220 million 
people. It will be the largest single element in 
international trade. Inevitably it will become a 
major factor in world affairs. 
The customs union feature of the Treaty of 
Rome has progressed very rapidly. The European 
members have taken the initial steps of reducing 
tariffs among themselves-so far by 50 percent--
and of agreeing on a common tariff against the 
rest of the world. The deadline for going down 
to zero tariffs within the Market is 1969, but it 
seems certain that this goal will be reached sooner. 
The agreement on the character of the Common 
Market tariff against the world has been reached, 
and the European Common Market members now 
negotiate as a unit with ourselves and with other 
countries. In all this immensely complicated 
business there has been no break in the forward 
movement. On the contrary, the Common Market 
members have exceeded their own timetable. 
Prospects of New Trading World 
The appearance of the Common Market on the 
world scene, and the prospective adherence of the 
United Kingdom, seems certain to face us with a 
fundamentally new kind of trading world. Up 
until now the United States has been the world's 
only mass market, i.e. a market having large num-
bers of people commanding large amounts of con-
sumer purchasing power. Now, suddenly, there 
is in sight another such unit, one which already 
imports twice as much as we do and which has a 
huge potential for expansion. 
One measure of the possibilities inherent in this 
new trading world that is already within our range 
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• ·. of vision is the present volume of ordinary dur-
,able consumer goods in the new Common Market 
.as compared with the United States. 
. In Western Europe telephones are relatively as 
-00mmon as they were in the United States in 1912. 
In automobile ownership Europe is as the United 
States was in 1920. The distribution of refrigera-
tors compares with the United States position as 
of 1935. In washing machines the European con-
sumer stands where the American consumer was 
in 1935. And so on. In brief, the European 
market for durable consumer goods is not only not 
saturated but in important respects is in its very 
infancy. If anything is certain in the world, it 
is that desires for these goods will increase. If 
the new European economy lives up to its promise, 
the ability to buy such goods will grow rapidly. 
This is part of the meaning of the new European 
mass market. It will be a market for the kinds 
of things we have learned to produce with great 
efficiency. Beyond that there will be needed the 
kinds of machinery and raw materials that are 
necessary for the expansion of manufacturing in-
dustries. Nobody now can estimate with assurance 
or precision the ultimate dimensions of the Euro-
pean market. The possibilities, however, are 
clearly very extensive-so extensive that we would 
have to be blind indeed not to see them. 
On this score alone our interests would seem 
quite obviously to call for the seeking of a close 
trading relationship with the Common Market. 
If we do nothing, the tendency would be for the 
new Europe to grow as a trading entity separated 
from us by a comparatively high common tariff. 
Behind this tariff producers in Europe would be 
impelled to develop quickly the capacity and the 
know-how for serving the European consumers, 
who would number, perhaps, up to 250 million. 
Our trade with Europe would not stop. It prob-
ably would grow, as European incomes grew. But 
we would not be able to take fullest advantage, or 
even optimum advantage, of the Common Market. 
To a considerable extent our skills in mass produc-
tion and in mass selling would not be allowed to be 
effective because of the European tariff barrier. 
It is this prospect that furnishes a main reason 
for the provision of special negotiating authority 
with the Common Market. If Britain adheres to 
the Rome Treaty, then the new bargaining power 
requested by the President will enable us to nego-
tiate with the Europeans across a range of com· 
modities where we or the Europeans or both now 
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are the most efficient producers in the world. We 
would be proposing, in effect, that we agree with 
the Europeans to compete with one another in 
these commodities without undue tariff barriers 
on either side. We would be proposing that the 
new European economy develop, within some 
limits at least, in a fashion consistent with the 
economic efficiencies that we and the Europeans 
already possess. There is, as I say, a direct and 
important commercial reason why we should pro-
ceed along these lines. Our producers need access 
to the potential European market, and we should 
be prepared to bargain as effectively as we can to 
get such access. If the past is any guide, our 
exports should benefit markedly from wider open-
ings in Western Europe. 
Building a Partnership With Europe 
In forging new links of trade with the emerg-
ing new Europe, moreover, we would be developing 
some of the terms of our association with what 
may become within foreseeable time the second 
greatest power in the world. The European states 
are taking the steps toward creating unity in an 
area that has been divided and fragmented ever 
since the decline of the Roman Empire. If the 
European movement continues to make progress, 
if the Treaty of Rome attracts adherents as it 
seems likely to do, the political consequences will 
be of truly enormous dimensions. 
The United States is a global power with major 
political, economic, and defense interests all around 
the globe. Apart from constitutional inhibitions, 
our position internationally would argue against 
full association with a European entity. We do 
need to find the ways to partnership, however. 
A strong, stable Europe can be an invaluable part-
ner in the years ahead, as we continue to contend 
with the expansive pressures of the Soviet Empire 
and with the growing pains of the new and the 
underdeveloped countries. 
The details of a partnership with Europe will 
have to be developed point by point, case by case. 
We are in fact already making progress on this ad 
hoa basis in the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development and elsewhere. It 
seems clear, however, that the partnership will not 
work very well in other fields if we are unable to 
find a means to accommodate to one another in 
trade. We do not need to become a member of the 
European customs union. We do not need to re-
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move all of our trade and tariff restrictions. We 
do need to find a minimum means for building an 
expanding and a mutually profitable trading rela-
tionship. 
H.R. 9900 is intended, in its Common Market 
provision, to provide the basis for discussion and 
negotiation with the Common Market along these 
lines. It will be a means and a beginning, not a 
conclusion or a happy ending. But if we lack the 
means or cannot make a beginning, then there can 
be no prospects for a successful ending. 
President Kennedy Hails Agreement 
for Northeast Brazil Development 
Following i,s the text of a letter from President 
Kennedy to President Goulart of Brazil concern-
ing an agreement signed at Washington on April 
13 by Secretary Ru.sk and Brazilian Foreign Min-
ister San Tiago Dantas under which the United 
States and Brazil are c0rntmitting a total of $276 
million for a program of development in northeast 
Brazil. 
White House press release dated April 12, for release April 13 
APRIL 13, 1962 
DEAR MR. Pru:smENT: I am deeply gratified by 
today's signature of an agreement 1 through 
which our two countries, under the Alliance for 
Progress, will work together in a program of 
development in the Northeast of Brazil. 
We approach this program with the same sense 
of urgency and in the same determined spirit that 
your government has demonstrated in its planning 
for this region. We share with you the convic-
tion that the twenty million people in the North-
east must be afforded an opportunity to participate 
in the future growth of Brazil, and that we must 
make a bold attack on the economic and social 
problems of the region. 
We work together under this program to give 
full meaning to the Alliance for Progress, confi-
dent that this undertaking will move us forward 
toward the goals set forth last August at Punta 
del Este. What makes it an Alliance program 
in the true sense is that the initiative came from 
Brazil; that the plan was conceived in your 
country; and that it will be administered by 
Brazilians. 
1 Not printed here. 
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Our joint program will consist of a two-pronged 
attack on the problems of the Northeast. , 
First, we will act to meet specific urgent needs· 
of highest priority to bring pure water to areas' 
that lack water, to create sources of electric power,• 
to provide education that will enhance workers 
skills, and to establish emergency health units 
throughout the areas. 
Second, we will pledge ninety-eight million dol-
lars to the first two years of your five year long-
range program of development-a program de: 
signed to bring about a steady increase in living 
standards, rising opportunities, and the integra-
tion of the Northeast into the national economy 
of Brazil. 
At the end of the two years we will conduct a 
joint review of the program and decide together 
how we can most effectively work toward our 
goals in the succeeding years. 
We are aware that the problems we face are 
complex and deep-rooted, that they will not yield 
to slogans or superficial action. Only hard work, 
patience and persistence in carrying project after 
project to completion will achieve what we seek: 
to change the face of Northeast Brazil and pro-
vide a better life for its people. 
I am most grateful, Mr. President, for this 
opportunity to join with you in what we hope will 
be a major contribution to a better life in our 
hemisphere. 
Sincerely, 
JOHN F. KENNEDY 
His Excellency 
J OAO BELCHIOR MARQUES GOULART 
President of the Republic of the 
United States of Brazil 
Brasilia, Brazil 
U.S. Announces Continuance 
of Relations With Argentina 
Department Statement 
Press release 257 dated April 118 
Ambassador [Robert] McClintock today ac-
knowledged the receipt of a note dated March 30, 
1962, from the Argentine Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Worship, thus continuing relations 
with the Government of Argentina. 
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